Communist Party of China
|Communist Party of China|
The emblem of the Communist Party of China.
|General Secretary||Xi Jinping|
|Founded||1 July 1921|
|Youth wing||Communist Youth League|
|Popular front||United Front|
|Armed wing||People's Liberation Army|
|Membership (2014)||86.7 million1|
|Ideology||Communism, Socialism with Chinese characteristics
(see "ideology" section)
|International affiliation||International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties|
|National People's Congress (number of seats)|
|Politics of People's Republic of China
|Communist Party of China|
|Hanyu Pinyin||Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng|
|Hanyu Pinyin||Zhōng Gòng|
جۇڭگو كوممۇنىستىك پارتىيە
The Communist Party of China (CPC)note 1 is the founding and ruling political party of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The CPC is the sole governing party of China, although it coexists alongside 8 other legal parties that make up the United Front. It was founded in 1921, chiefly by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. The party grew quickly, and by 1949 the CPC had defeated the Kuomintang (KMT) in a 10-year civil war, thus leading to the establishment of the People's Republic of China. With a membership of 86.7 million, it is the largest political party in the world.
The CPC is organized on the basis of democratic centralism, a principle conceived by Russian Marxist theoretician Vladimir Lenin which entails democratic and open discussion on policy on the condition of unity in upholding the agreed upon policies. The highest body of the CPC is the National Congress, convened every fifth year. When the National Congress is not in session, the Central Committee is the highest body, but since the body meets normally only once a year, most duties and responsibilities are vested in the Politburo and its Standing Committee. The party's leader holds the offices of General Secretary (responsible for civilian party duties), Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (responsible for military affairs) and state president (a largely ceremonial position). Through these posts the party leader is the country's paramount leader. The current party leader is Xi Jinping, elected at the 18th National Congress (held in 2012).
The CPC is still committed to communist thought. According to the party constitution the CPC adheres to Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, socialism with Chinese characteristics, Deng Xiaoping Theory, Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development. The official explanation for China's economic reforms is that the country is in the primary stage of socialism, a developmental stage similar to the capitalist mode of production. The planned economy established under Mao Zedong was replaced by the socialist market economy, the current economic system, on the basis that "Practice is the Sole Criterion for the Truth" (i.e. the planned economy was deemed inefficient).
Since the collapse of Eastern European communist regimes in 1989–1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the CPC has emphasized its party-to-party relations with the ruling parties of the remaining socialist states. While the CPC still maintains party-to-party relations with non-ruling communist parties around the world, it has since the 1980s established relations with several non-communist parties, most notably with ruling parties of one-party states (whatever their ideology), dominant parties in democratic systems (whatever their ideology), and social democratic parties.
- 1 History
- 2 Governance
- 3 Organization
- 3.1 National Congress
- 3.2 Bodies of the Central Committee
- 3.3 Lower-level organizations
- 3.4 Members
- 3.5 Communist Youth League
- 4 Symbols
- 5 Ideology
- 6 Party-to-party relations
- 7 See also
- 8 Notes
- 9 References
- 10 External links
The CPC has its origins in the May Fourth Movement of 1919, during which radical ideologies like anarchism and communism gained traction among Chinese intellectuals.2 Li Dazhao was the first leading Chinese intellectual who publicly supported Leninism and world revolution.3 In contrast to Chen Duxiu, Li did not renounce participation in the affairs of the Republic of China.4 Both of them regarded the October Revolution in Russia as groundbreaking, believing it to herald a new era for oppressed countries everywhere.4 The CPC was modeled on Vladimir Lenin's theory of a vanguard party.5 Study circles were, according to Cai Hesen, "the rudiments [of our party]".6 Several study circles were established during the New Culture Movement, but "by 1920 skepticism about their suitability as vehicles for reform had become widespread."7
The founding National Congress of the CPC was held on 23–31 July 1921.8 While it was originally planned to be held in Shanghai French Concession, police officers interrupted the meeting on 3 July.8 Because of that, the congress was moved to a tourist boat on South Lake in Jiaxing, Zhenjiang province.8 Only 12 delegates attended the congress, with neither Li nor Chen being able to attend.8 Chen sent a personal representative to attend the congress.8 The resolutions of the congress called for the establishment of a communist party (as a branch of the Communist International) and elected Chen as its leader.8
The communists dominated the left wing of the KMT, a party organized on Leninist lines, struggling for power with the party's right wing.9 When KMT leader Sun Yat-sen died in May 1925, he was succeeded by a rightist, Chiang Kai-shek, who initiated moves to marginalize the position of the communists.9 Fresh from the success of the Northern Expedition to overthrow the warlords, Chiang Kai-shek turned on the communists, who by now numbered in the tens of thousands across China.10 Ignoring the orders of the Wuhan-based KMT government, he marched on Shanghai, a city controlled by communist militias. Although the communists welcomed Chiang's arrival, he turned on them, massacring 5000 with the aid of the Green Gang.101112 Chiang's army then marched on Wuhan, but was prevented from taking the city by CPC General Ye Ting and his troops.13 Chiang's allies also attacked communists; in Beijing, 19 leading communists were killed by Zhang Zuolin, while in Changsha, He Jian's forces machine gunned hundreds of peasant militiamen.1415 That May, tens of thousands of communists and their sympathisers were killed by nationalists, with the CPC losing approximately 15,000 of its 25,000 members.15
The CPC continued supporting the Wuhan KMT government,15 but on 15 July 1927 the Wuhan government expelled all communists from the KMT.16 The CPC reacted by founding the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of China, better known as the "Red Army", to battle the KMT. A battalion led by General Zhu De was ordered to take the city of Nanchang on 1 August 1927 in what became known as the Nanchang Uprising; initially successful, they were forced into retreat after five days, marching south to Shantou, and from there being driven into the wilderness of Fujian.16 Mao Zedong was appointed commander-in-chief of the Red Army, and led four regiments against Changsha in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, hoping to spark peasant uprisings across Hunan.17 His plan was to attack the KMT-held city from three directions on 9 September, but the Fourth Regiment deserted to the KMT cause, attacking the Third Regiment. Mao's army made it to Changsha, but could not take it; by 15 September, he accepted defeat, with 1000 survivors marching east to the Jinggang Mountains of Jiangxi.171819
The near-destruction of the CPC's urban organizational apparatus led to institutional changes within the party.20 The party adopted democratic centralism, a way to organize revolutionary parties, and established a Politburo (functioned as the standing committee of the Central Committee).20 The result was increased centralization of power within the party .20 At every-level of the party this was duplicated, with standing committees now in effective control.20 After Chen Duxiu's dismissal, Li Lisan was able to assume de facto control of the party organization by 1929–30.20 Li Lisan's leadership was a failure, and by the end of it, the CPC was on the brink of destruction.20 The Comintern became involved, and by late-1930, he had been taken away his powers.20 By 1935 Mao had become the party's informal leader, with Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian, the formal head of the party, serving as his informal deputies.20 The conflict with the KMT led to the reorganization of the Red Army, with power now centralized in the leadership through the creation of CPC political departments charged with supervising the army.20
The Second Sino-Japanese War caused a pause in the conflict between the CPC and the KMT.21 The Second United Front was established between the CPC and the KMT to tackle the invasion.22 While the front formally existed until 1945, all collaboration between the two parties had ended by 1940.22 Despite their formal alliance, the CPC used the opportunity to expand and carve out independent bases of operations to prepare for the coming war with the KMT.23 In 1939 the KMT began to restrict CPC expansion within China.23 This led to frequent clashes between CPC and KMT forces.23 It did not take long before the situation were deescalated, since none of the parties considered a civil war an option at this time.23 Despite this, by 1943 the CPC was again actively expanding its territory at the expense of the KMT.23
From 1945 until 1949, the war had been reduced to two parties; the CPC and the KMT.24 This period lasted through four stages; the first was from August 1945 (when the Japanese surrendered) to June 1946 (when the peace talks between the CPC and the KMT ended).24 By 1945, the KMT had three-times more soldiers under its command then the CPC, and because of it, it looked early on like it was winning.24 With the cooperation of the Americans and the Japanese, the KMT was able to retake major parts of the country.24 Around the same time, the CPC launched an invasion of Manchuria, where they were given assistance by the Soviet Union.24 However, KMT rule over the reconquested territories would prove unpopular because of endemic corruption within the party.24 However, the main failure was that the KMT, with 2 million more troops than the CPC, failed to reconquer the rural territories which made up the CPC's stronghold.24 The second stage, lasting from July 1946 to June 1947, saw KMT extend its control over major cities, such as Yanan (the CPC headquarter for much of the war).24 The KMT's successes were hollow, the CPC had tactically withdrawn from the cities, and instead attacked KMT authorities by instigating protests amongst students and intellectuals in the cities (the KMT responded to these events with heavy-handed repression).25 In the meantime, the KMT was struggling with factional infighting and Chiang Kai-shek's autocratic control over the party, which weakened the KMT's ability to respond to attacks.25 The third stage, lasting from July 1947 to August 1948, saw a limited counteroffensive by the CPC.25 The objective was to clear "Central China, strengthening North China, and recovering Northeast China."26 This policy, coupled with desertions from the KMT military force (by spring 1948 KMT military had lost an estimated 2 million troops, having 1 million troops left) and the increasing unpopularity of KMT rule.25 The result was that the CPC was able to cut off KMT garrisons in Manchuria and retake several lost territories.26 The last stage, lasting from September 1948 to December 1949, saw the communist take the initiative and the collapse of KMT rule in mainland China.26 On 1 October 1949, Mao declared the establishment of the PRC, which signified the end of the Chinese Revolution (as it is officially described by the CPC).26
The Chinese Revolution, directed by Mao Zedong and the CPC, led to the establishment of the (PRC) in 1949.25 The PRC was founded on Marxist–Leninist principles, or more precisely, the sinification of Marxism–Leninism (officially known as Mao Zedong Thought or Maoism).27 During the 1960s and 1970s, the CPC experienced a significant ideological separation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.28 By that time, Mao had begun saying that the "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" stipulated that class enemies continued to exist even though the socialist revolution seemed to be complete, leading to the Cultural Revolution.29
Following Mao's death in 1976, a power struggle between CPC General Secretary Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping erupted.30 Deng won the struggle, and became the "paramount leader".30 Deng, alongside Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, spearheaded the Reform and opening policy, and introduced the ideological concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics.31 In reversing some of Mao's "extreme-leftist" policies, Deng argued that a socialist state could use the market economy without itself being capitalist.32 While asserting the political power of the Party, the change in policy generated significant economic growth.2 The new ideology, however, was contested on both sides of the spectrum, by Maoists as well as by those supporting political liberalization. With other social factors, the conflicts culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.33 Deng's vision on economics prevailed, and by the early 1990s the concept a socialist market economy had been introduced.34 In 1997, Deng's beliefs (Deng Xiaoping Theory), were embedded in the CPC constitution.35
CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng as “paramount leader” in the 1990s, and continued most of his policies.36 As part of Jiang Zemin's nominal legacy, the CPC ratified the Three Represents for the 2003 revision of the Party constitution, as a "guiding ideology" to encourage the Party to represent "advanced productive forces, the progressive course of China's culture, and the fundamental interests of the people."37 The theory has legitimized the entry of private business owners and bourgeois elements into the party.37 Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin's successor as paramount leader, took office in 2002.38 Unlike Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin, Hu laid emphasis on collective leadership and opposed one-man dominance of the political system.38 The insistence on focusing on economic growth has led to a wide range of serious social problems. To address these, Hu introduced two main ideological concepts: the Scientific Outlook on Development and Harmonious Socialist Society.39 Hu resigned from his post as CPC General Secretary and Chairman of the CMC at the 18th National Congress held in 2012, and was succeeded in both posts by Xi Jinping.40 Since taking power Xi has initiated the most concerted anti-corruption effort in decades, while centralizing powers in the office of CPC General Secretary at the expense of the collective leadership which has led foreign commentators to liken him to Mao.41
Currently, in a bid to curtail the powers of the individuals, collective leadership, the idea that decisions will be taken through consensus, has become the ideal in the CPC.42 The concept has its origins back to Vladimir Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party.43 At the level of the central party leadership this means that, for instance, all members of the Politburo Standing Committee are of equal standing (each member having only one vote).42 A member of the Politburo Standing Committee often represents a sector; during Mao's reign, he controlled the People's Liberation Army, Kang Sheng the security apparatus and Zhou Enlai the State Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.42 This counts as informal power.42 Despite this, in a paradoxical relation, members of a body are ranked hierarchically (despite the fact that members are in theory equal to each others).42 In spite of this, the CPC is led by an informal leader principle, each collective leadership is led by a core, that is a paramount leader; a person who holds the offices of CPC General Secretary, CMC chairman and President of the PRC.44 Before Jiang Zemin's tenure as paramount leader, the party core and collective leadership were indistinguishable.45 In practice, the core was not responsible to the collective leadership.45 However, by the time of Jiang, the party had begun propagating a responsibility system, referring to it in official pronouncements to the "core of the collective leadership".45
The CPC's organizational principle is democratic centralism, which is based on two principles; democracy (synonymous in official discourse with "socialist democracy" and "inner-party democracy") and centralism.46 This has been the guiding organizational principle of the party since the 5th National Congress, held in 1927.46 In the words of the party constitution, "The Party is an integral body organized under its program and constitution and on the basis of democratic centralism".46 Mao once quipped that democratic centralism was "at once democratic and centralized, with the two seeming opposites of democracy and centralization united in a definite form." Mao claimed that the superiority of democratic centralism laid in its internal contradictions, between democracy and centralism, and freedom and discipline.46 Currently, the CPC is claiming that "democracy is the lifeline of the Party, the lifeline of socialism".46 But for democracy to be implemented, and functioning properly, there needs to be centralization.46 Democracy in any form, the CPC claims, needs centralism, since without centralism there will be no order.46 According to Mao, democratic centralism "is centralized on the basis of democracy and democratic under centralized guidance. This is the only system that can give full expression to democracy with full powers vested in the people’s congresses at all levels and, at the same time, guarantee centralized administration with the governments at each level exercising centralized management of all the affairs entrusted to them by the people’s congresses at the corresponding level and safeguarding whatever is essential to the democratic life of the people".46
The Multi-party Cooperation and Political Consultation System is led by the CPC in cooperation and consultation with the 8 parties which make up the United Front.47 Consultation takes place under the leadership of the CPC, with mass organizations, the United Front parties, and "representatives from all walks of life".47 These consultations contribute, at least in theory, to the formation of the country's basic policy in the fields of political, economic, cultural and social affairs.47 The CPC's relationship with other parties is based on the principle of "long-term coexistence and mutual supervision, treating each other with full sincerity and sharing weal or woe."47 This process is institutionalized in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).47 All the parties in the United Front support China's road to socialism, and hold steadfast to the leadership of the CPC.47 Despite all this, the CPPCC is a body without any real power.48 While discussions do take place, they are all supervised by the CPC.48
|This article is part of a series on the
politics and government of
The National Congress is the party's supreme organ, and is held every fifth year (in the past there were long intervals between congresses, but since the 9th National Congress in 1969, congresses have been held regularly).49 According to the party's constitution, a congress may not be postponed except "under extraordinary circumstances".50 A congress may be held before the given date if the Central Committee so decides, or if "one third of the party organizations at the provincial level so request".50 Under Mao, the delegates to congresses were appointed; however, since 1982 the congress delegates have been elected, due to the decision that there must be more candidates than seats.51 At the 15th National Congress in 1997, for instance, several princelings (the sons or daughters of powerful CPC officials) failed to be elected to the 15th Central Committee; among them were Chen Yuan, Wang Jun and Bo Xilai.52 The elections are carried out through secret ballots.50 Despite this, certain seats are not subject to elections; instead, the outgoing Central Committee "recommends" certain choices to the party electorate.53 These figures are mostly high-ranking members of the party leadership or special guests.53 For instance, at the 15th National Congress, 60 seats were given to members who had joined the CPC before 1927, and some were given to the outgoing members of the 15th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the 15th Central Committee.53
The party constitution gives the National Congress six responsibilities: (1) electing the party's executive and legislative branches, represented by the Central Committee; (2) electing the judicial branch, represented by the CCDI; (3) to examining the report of the outgoing Central Committee; (4) examining the report of the outgoing CCDI; (5) discussing and enacting party policies; and (6) revising the party's constitution.53 However, the delegates rarely discuss issues in length at the National Congresses; most discussion takes place before the congress, in the preparation period.53
According to the CPC-published book Concise History of the Communist Party of China, the party's first constitution was adopted at the 1st National Congress.54 Since then several constitutions have been written, such as the second constitution, adopted at the 7th National Congress.54 The constitution regulates party life, and the CCDI is responsible for supervising the party to ensure that it is followed.55 The constitution currently in force was adopted at the 12th National Congress.56 It has many affinities with the state constitution, and they are generally amended either at party congresses or shortly thereafter.57 The preamble of the state constitution is largely copied from the "General Program" (the preamble) of the party constitution.58
The Central Committee is empowered by the party constitution to enact policies in the periods between party congresses.59 A Central Committee is de jure elected by a party Congress, but in reality its membership is chosen by the central party leadership.59 The authority of the Central Committee has increased in recent years, with the leaders rarely, if ever, going against Central Committee, which often occurred during the early years of the People's Republic.50 The Central Committee is required to meet at least once every year;60 however, in the early years of the People's Republic there were several years when it did not convene at all; 1951–53, 1960, 1963–65, 1967, 1971, 1974 and 1976.61
While the Central Committee is the highest organ in the periods between party congresses, few resolutions cite its name. Instead, the majority of party resolutions refer to the "Communist Party Centre", an indirect way of protecting the powers of, and resolutions produced by, the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee and the General Secretary.60 This method shields the central party leadership from lower-level bodies, reducing accountability, as lower levels can never be sure which body produced which resolution.60 In contrast to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the CPC Central Committee does not have the power to remove general secretaries or other leading officials, despite the fact that the party constitution grants it those rights.62 When the CPV dismissed its General Secretary Do Muoi, it convened a special session of its Central Committee, and when it chose its new general secretary, it convened another Central Committee plenum.62 In contrast, in China, when the CPC dismissed Hu Yaobang (in 1987) and Zhao Ziyang in 1989, the Politburo, not the Central Committee, convened a special session.60 Not only did the meeting itself break constitutional practices, since the CPC constitution clearly states that a Central Committee session must be called, but the meeting included several party veterans who were neither formal members of the Politburo nor of the Central Committee.62 In short, the CPC Central Committee, in contrast to the CPV Central Committee, is responsible to the higher bodies of the party (the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee), while in Vietnam the higher bodies are accountable to the Central Committee.63
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is responsible for monitoring and punishing CPC cadres who abuse power, are corrupt or in general commit wrongdoing.64 CCDI organs exist at every level of the party hierarchy.64 The CCDI is the successor to the Control Commission, abolished in 1968 at the height of the Cultural Revolution.65 Although the CCDI was originally designed to restore party morale and discipline, it has taken over many of the functions of the former Control Commission.66 The CCDI is elected by the National Congress, held every fifth year.66
At the party's founding in 1921, Chen Duxiu was elected as the party leader, holding the position of Secretary of the Central Bureau. As the party expanded, the title changed several times over the next 3 years, until in 1925 the position of General Secretary was introduced.67 The term General Secretary continued in general use until 1943, when Mao Zedong was elected as Chairman of the Politburo. In 1945, Mao was elected Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, the title he held for the rest of his life.67 The office of General Secretary was revived in 1956 at the 8th National Congress, but it functioned as a lesser office, responsible to the office of the CPC Chairman.68 At a party meeting in 1959, Mao explained the relationship between the CPC Chairman and the CPC General Secretary as follows: "As Chairman, I am the commander; as General Secretary, Deng Xiaoping is deputy commander."69
The office of Chairman of the Communist Party was abolished in 1982, and replaced with that of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee.70 According to the party constitution, the General Secretary must be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), and is responsible for convening meetings of the PSC and the Politburo, while also presiding over the work of the Secretariat.71
The party's leader holds the offices of General Secretary (responsible for civilian party duties), Chairman of the CMC (responsible for military affairs) and President of the PRC (a largely ceremonial position). Through these posts the party leader is the country's paramount leader.
The Politburo of the Central Committee "exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session".72 It is formally elected at the first plenary meeting of each newly elected Central Committee.72 In reality, however, Politburo membership is decided by the central party leadership.72 During his rule, Mao controlled the composition of the Politburo himself.72 The Politburo was de facto the highest organ of power until the 8th National Congress, when the PSC was established.68 The powers given to the PSC came at the expense of the Politburo.68 The Politburo meets at least once a month.73 The CPC General Secretary is responsible for convening the Politburo.71
From 2003 onwards, the Politburo has been delivering a work report to every Central Committee plenum, further cementing the Politburo's status as accountable to the Central Committee.74 Also, from the 16th National Congress onwards, the CPC has been reporting on meetings of the Politburo, the PSC and its study sessions.75 However, the reports do not contain all the information discussed at the meetings; the end of the reports usually notes that "other matters" were also discussed at the meeting.75
In the Politburo, decisions are reached through consensus, not votes.76 In certain cases, straw votes are used to see how many members support or oppose a certain case (these straw votes do not necessarily affect the ultimate decision).76 Every member has the right to participate in the collective discussion.76 It is the CPC General Secretary who convenes the Politburo and sets the agenda for the meeting.76 Each Politburo member is told of the agenda beforehand, and is given materials by the General Secretary on the subject so as to be prepared for the discussions.76 The first person to speak at the meeting is the member who proposed the agenda.76 After that, those who know about the subject, or whose work is directly related to it, may speak.76 Then those who doubt or oppose the agenda speak.76 Lastly, the General Secretary speaks, and he usually supports the agenda, as he supported discussing it in the first place.76 When the General Secretary is finished speaking, he calls for a vote.76 If the vote is unanimous or nearly so, it may be accepted; if the vote is nearly unanimous, but members who directly work in the area discussed oppose it, the issue will be postponed.77 When the Politburo enacts a decision without all the members' agreement, the other members usually try to convince their opponents.77 In many ways, the CPC Politburo's decision-making process remains very similar to that of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union after Nikita Khrushchev's removal.78
The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) is the highest organ of the Communist Party when neither the Politburo, the Central Committee and the National Congress are in session.79 It convenes at least once a week.73 It was established at the 8th National Congress, in 1958, to take over the policy-making role formerly assumed by the Secretariat.68 The PSC is "the primary decision-making body, though there is growing evidence of its being made more responsive to the collective agreements of the entire Politburo."80 Despite formal rules stating that a PSC member must serve a term in the Politburo before advancing to the PSC, this rule has been breached twice, first in 1992 when Hu Jintao was appointed to PSC, and again in 2007 when Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were appointed to it.81 In reality, however, the PSC is not accountable to the Central Committee and has never been.82
The Secretariat of the Central Committee is headed by the General Secretary and is responsible for supervising the central party organizations: departments, commissions, newspapers, etc.83 In tandem with these its responsible for implementing the decisions of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee.83 The Secretariat was abolished in 1966 and its formal functions taken over by the Central Office of Management, but it was reestablished in 1980.83 To be appointed to the Secretariat, a person has to be nominated by the Politburo Standing Committee; the nomination must be approved by the Central Committee.84
The Central Military Commission is elected by the Central Committee, and is responsible for the PLA.85 The position of CMC Chairman is one of the most powerful in China, and the CMC Chairman must concurrently serve as CPC General Secretary.85 Unlike the collective leadership ideal of other party organs, the CMC Chairman acts as commander-in-chief with the right to appoint or dismiss top military officers as he pleases.85 The CMC Chairman can deploy troops, controls the country's nuclear weapons, and allocates the budget.85 The promotion or transfer of officers above the divisional level must be validated by the CMC Chairman's signature.85
In theory, the CMC Chairman is under the responsibility of the Central Committee, but in practice, he reports only to the paramount leader.85 This is in many ways due to Mao, who did not want other Politburo members to involve themselves in military affairs.86 As he put it, "the Politburo's realm is state affairs, the CMC's is military".86 This state of things has continued until today.86 The CMC has controlled the PLA through three organs since 1937: the General Staff Department, the General Political Department and the General Logistics Department.86 A fourth organ, the General Armaments Department, was established in 1998.86
The Central National Security Commission (CNSC) was established at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee (held in 2013).87 Its purpose is to "co-ordinate security strategies across various departments, including intelligence, the military, foreign affairs and the police in order to cope with growing challenges to stability at home and abroad."87 The idea of establishing a CNSC was first mentioned in the 1980s, but was muted "by vested interests that stand to lose power in a reshuffle".87 Currently little is known of the body outside of the CPC, but it is generally believed to have strengthened the party's control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese armed forces.88 On 24 January 2014 Xi Jinping, the current CPC General Secretary, was appointed CNSC Chairman, while Li Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council, and Zhang Dejiang, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC (head of parliament), were appointed CNSC deputy chairmen.88
There are several organs under the auspices of the Central Committee. The following are the most important:50
- General Office — The nerve center of the CPC; acts as the primary day-to-day administrative body of the Central Committee, responsible for communication and drafting party documents. For instance, it handles classified documents and information from party organs nationwide.89
- Central Organization Department (COD) — Established in 1921,91 functioning like the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).92 At the beginning, the COD was principally occupied with creating files on the party's members, to see if they were committed communists or not.93 According to analyst Richard McGregor, the "The Central Organisation Department is [the CPC's] third and least-known pillar of power".94 The COD is responsible for personnel appointments throughout the CPC.95
- Central Publicity Department (CPD) — Controls news and information to the Chinese public.95 It functions to protect the interest of the CPC on the basis of the party line and the ideological concept of the Four Cardinal Principles.96
- Central International Liaison Department (CILD) — The CPC's "foreign affairs ministry", responsible for relations with foreign parties as well as for gathering foreign intelligence.97 During the Cold War, the CILD fought for domination in the global communist movement against the CPSU's International Department, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, its responsibilities have widened to include foreign relations with all types of parties: communists, socialists, liberals, etc.97
- Central United Front Work Department (CUFWD) — Responsible for increasing the party's support base outside its direct purview, in the business community and civil organizations.95
- Central Policy Research Office (CPRO) — Responsible for researching issues of significant interest to the central party leadership.98
- Central Taiwan Work Office (CTWO) —The general office of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs (CLGTA), responsible for preparing agendas for its meetings, coordinating paper flow and communicating with other organs on the CLGTA's behalf.99
- Central External Propaganda Office (CEPO) — The party version of the State Council Information Office, responsible to the Central Leading Small Group for External Propaganda. This is a bureaucratic duality, called in China "one organ, two signboards", literally two names for the same institution.100
- Central Party School (CPI) — Provides political training and ideological indoctrination in communist thought for high-ranking CPC cadres and rising CPC cadres.101 It publishes the theoretical magazines Seeking Truth from Facts and Study Times.101
- People's Daily — One of the most recognized Chinese media outlets, the newspaper functions as one of the voices of the central party leadership.102
- Party History Research Centre (PHSC) — Established in 1980 to set priorities for scholarly research in universities, the Academy of Social Science and the Central Party School.103
- Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (CCTB) — Established in 1953 with the aim of studying and translating the classical works of Marxism.104
Party committees exist at the level of provinces; autonomous regions; municipalities directly under the central government; cities divided into districts; autonomous prefectures; counties (including banners); autonomous counties; cities not divided into districts; and municipal districts.105 These committees are elected by party congresses (at their own level).105 Local party congresses are supposed to be held every fifth year, but under extraordinary circumstances they may be held earlier or postponed. However that decision must be approved by the next higher level of the local party committee.105 The number of delegates and the procedures for their election are decided by the local party committee, but must also have the approval of the next higher party committee.105
A local party congress has many of the same duties as the National Congress, and it is responsible for examining the report of the local Party Committee at the corresponding level; examining the report of the local Commission for Discipline Inspection at the corresponding level; discussing and adopting resolutions on major issues in the given area; and electing the local Party Committee and the local Commission for Discipline Inspection at the corresponding level.105 Party committees of "a province, autonomous region, municipality directly under the central government, city divided into districts, or autonomous prefecture [are] elected for a term of five years", and include full and alternate members.105 The party committees "of a county (banner), autonomous county, city not divided into districts, or municipal district [are] elected for a term of five years", but full and alternate members "must have a Party standing of three years or more."105 If a local Party Congress is held before or after the given date, the term of the members of the Party Committee shall be correspondingly shortened or lengthened.105
A local Party Committee is responsible to the Party Committee at the next higher level.105 The number of full and alternate members at the local Party Committee is decided by the Party Committee at the next higher level.105 Vacancies in a Party Committee shall be filled by an alternate members according to the order of precedence, which is decided by the number of votes an alternate member got during his or hers election.105 A Party Committee must convene for at least two plenary meetings a year.105 During its tenure, a Party Committee shall "carry out the directives of the next higher Party organizations and the resolutions of the Party congresses at the corresponding levels."105 The local Standing Committee (analogous to the Central Politburo) is elected at the first plenum of the corresponding Party Committee after the local party congress.105 A Standing Committee is responsible to the Party Committee at the corresponding level and the Party Committee at the next higher level.105 A Standing Committee exercises the duties and responsibilities of the corresponding Party Committee when it is not in session.105
To join the party, an applicant must be 18 years of age, and must spend a year as a probationary member.106 In contrast to the past, when emphasis was placed on the applicants' ideological criteria, the current CPC stresses technical and educational qualifications.106 However, applicants and members are expected to be both "red and expert".106 To become a probationary member, two current CPC members must recommend the applicant to the local party leadership.106 The recommending members must acquaint themselves with the applicants, and be aware of the "applicant's ideology, character, personnel records and work performance" while teaching them about the party's program and constitution, as well as the duties and responsibilities of members.106 To this end, the recommending members must write a report to the local party leadership, reporting their opinion that the applicant is either qualified or unqualified for membership.106 To become a probationary member, the applicant must take an admission oath before the party flag.106 The relevant CPC organization is responsible for observing and educating probationary members.106 Probationary members have duties similar to those of full members, with the exception that they may not vote in party elections nor stand for election.106
Before 1949, joining the CPC was a matter of personal commitment to the communist cause. After 1949, people joined to gain good government jobs or access to universities, which were then limited to CPC members.106 Many joined the CPC through the Communist Youth League.106 Under Jiang Zemin, private entrepreneurs were allowed to become party members.106 According to Article 3 of the CPC constitution, a member must "conscientiously study Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thoughts of Three Represents, study the Scientific Outlook on Development, study the Party's line, principles, policies and resolutions, acquire essential knowledge concerning the Party, obtain general, scientific, legal and professional knowledge and work diligently to enhance their ability to serve the people."105 A member, in short, must follow orders, be disciplined, uphold unity, serve the Party and the people, and promote the socialist way of life.105 Members enjoy the privilege of attending Party meetings, reading relevant Party documents, receiving Party education, participating in Party discussions through the Party's newspapers and journals, making suggestions and proposal, making "well-grounded criticism of any Party organization or member at Party meetings" (even of the central party leadership), voting and standing for election, and of opposing and criticizing Party resolutions ("provided that they resolutely carry out the resolution or policy while it is in force"); and they have the ability "to put forward any request, appeal, or complaint to higher Party organizations, even up to the Central Committee, and ask the organizations concerned for a responsible reply."105 No party organization, including the CPC central leadership, can deprive a member of these rights.105
As of the 18th National Congress, farmers, herdsmen and fishermen make up 31 percent of the party membership; 9 percent are workers.107 The second largest membership group, "Managing, professional and technical staff in enterprises and public institutions", makes up 23 percent of CPC membership.107 Retirees make up 18 percent, "Party and government staff" make up 8 percent, "others" make up another 8 percent, and students are 3 percent of CPC membership.107 Men make-up 77 percent of CPC membership, while woman make up 23 percent.108 The CPC currently has 86.7 million members, making it the largest political party in the world.1
The Communist Youth League (CYL) is the CPC's youth wing, and the largest mass organization for youth in China.109 According to the CPC's constitution the CYL is a "mass organization of advanced young people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China; it functions as a party school where a large number of young people learn about socialism with Chinese characteristics and about communism through practice; it is the Party's assistant and reserve force."105 To join, an applicant has to be between the ages of 14 and 28.109 It controls and supervises Young Pioneers, a youth organization for children below the age of 14.109 The organizational structure of CYL is an exact copy of the CPC's; the highest body is the National Congress, followed by the Central Committee, Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee.110 However, the Central Committee (and all central organs) of the CYL work under the guidance of the CPC central leadership.105 Therefore, in a peculiar situation, CYL bodies are both responsible to higher bodies within CYL and the CPC, a distinct organization.105 As of the 17th National Congress (held in 2013), CYL has 89 million members.111
According to the Article 53 of the CPC constitution, "the Party emblem and flag are the symbol and sign of the Communist Party of China."105 At the beginning of its history, the CPC did not have a single official standard for the flag, but instead allowed individual party committees to copy the flag of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.112 On 28 April 1942, the Central Politburo decreed the establishment of a sole official flag. "The flag of the CPC has the length-to-width proportion of 3:2 with a hammer and sickle in the upper-left corner, and with no five-pointed star. The Political Bureau authorizes the General Office to custom-make a number of standard flags and distribute them to all major organs".112 According to People's Daily, "The standard party flag is 120 centimeters (cm) in length and 80 cm in width. In the center of the upper-left corner (a quarter of the length and width to the border) is a yellow hammer-and-sickle 30 cm in diameter. The flag sleeve (pole hem) is in white and 6.5 cm in width. The dimension of the pole hem is not included in the measure of the flag. The red color symbolizes revolution; the hammer-and-sickle are tools of workers and peasants, meaning that the Communist Party of China represents the interests of the masses and the people; the yellow color signifies brightness."112 In total the flag has five dimensions, the sizes are "no. 1: 388 cm in length and 192 cm in width; no. 2: 240 cm in length and 160 cm in width; no. 3: 192 cm in length and 128 cm in width; no. 4: 144 cm in length and 96 cm in width; no. 5: 96 cm in length and 64 cm in width."112 On 21 September 1966, the CPC General Office issued "Regulations on the Production and Use of the CPC Flag and Emblem", which stated that the emblem and flag were the official symbols and signs of the party.112
It has been argued in recent years, mainly by foreign commentators, that the CPC does not have an ideology, and that the party organization is pragmatic and interested only in what works.113 This simplistic view is wrong in many ways, since official statements make it very clear the party does have a coherent worldview.113 For instance, Hu Jintao stated in 2012 that the Western world is "threatening to divide us" and that "the international culture of the West is strong while we are weak ... Ideological and cultural fields are our main targets".113 The CPC puts a great deal of effort into the party schools and into crafting its ideological message.113 Before the "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for the Truth" campaign, the relationship between ideology and decision-making was a deductive one, meaning that policy-making was derived from ideological knowledge.114 Under Deng this relationship was turned upside down, with decision-making justifying ideology and not the other way around.114 Lastly, Chinese policy-makers believe that one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet Union was its stagnant state ideology. They therefore believe that their party ideology must be dynamic to safeguard the party's rule, unlike the Soviet Union's communist party, whose ideology they believe became "rigid, unimaginative, ossified, and disconnected from reality."114
Marxism–Leninism was the first official ideology of the Communist Party of China, and is a combination of classical Marxism (the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels) and Leninism (the thoughts of Vladimir Lenin).116 According to the CPC, "Marxism–Leninism reveals the universal laws governing the development of history of human society." To the CPC, Marxism–Leninism provides a vision of the contradictions in capitalist society and of the inevitability of a future socialist and communist societies.116 Marx and Engels first created the theory behind Marxist party building; Lenin developed it in practice before, during and after the Russian Revolution of 1917.116 Lenin's biggest achievement came in party-building, through concepts such as the vanguard party of the working class and democratic centralism.116 According to the People's Daily, Mao Zedong Thought "is Marxism–Leninism applied and developed in China".116
Mao Zedong Thought was conceived not only by Mao Zedong, but by leading party officials.117 According to Xinhua, Mao Zedong Thought is "an integration of the universal truth of Marxism–Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution."117 Currently, the CPC interprets the essence of Mao Zedong Thought as "Seeking truth from facts": "we [CPC] must proceed from reality and put theory into practice in everything. In other words, we must integrate the universal theory of Marxism–Leninism with China's specific conditions."117
While analysts generally agree that the CPC has rejected orthodox Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (or at least basic thoughts within orthodox thinking), the CPC itself disagrees.118 Some Western commentators also talk about a "crisis of ideology" within the party; they believe that the CPC has rejected communism.118 Wang Xuedong, the Director of the Institute of World Socialism, said in response, "We know there are those abroad who think we have a 'crisis of ideology,' but we do not agree."118 According to Jiang Zemin, the CPC "must never discard Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” He said that “if we did, we would lose our foundation.”119 He further noted that Marxism in general "like any science, needs to change as time and circumstances advance."119 Certain groups argue that Jiang Zemin ended the CPC's formal commitment to Marxism with the introduction of the ideological theory, the Three Represents.120 However, party theorist Leng Rong disagrees, claiming that "President Jiang rid the Party of the ideological obstacles to different kinds of ownership [...] He did not give up Marxism or socialism. He strengthened the Party by providing a modern understanding of Marxism and socialism—which is why we talk about a ‘socialist market economy’ with Chinese characteristics."120 Marxism in its core is, according to Jiang Zemin, methodology and the goal of a future, classless society, not analyses of class and of the contradictions between different classes.121
Karl Marx argued that society went through different stages of development, and believed that the capitalist mode of production was the third stage.122 The stages were: ancient, based mostly on slavery; feudal; capitalist; socialist; and the communist mode of production.122 The attainment of true "communism" is described as the CPC's and China's "ultimate goal".123 While the CPC claims that China is in the primary stage of socialism, party theorists argue that the current development stage "looks a lot like capitalism". Alternately, certain party theorists argue that “capitalism is the early or first stage of communism.”123 In official pronouncements, the primary stage of socialism is predicted to last about 100 years, after which China will reach another developmental stage.123 Some have dismissed the concept of a primary stage of socialism as intellectual cynicism.123 According to Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a China analyst, "When I first heard this rationale, I thought it more comic than clever—a wry caricature of hack propagandists leaked by intellectual cynics. But the 100-year horizon comes from serious political theorists".123
While Westerners have argued that the reforms introduced by the CPC under Deng were a rejection of the party's Marxist heritage and ideology, the CPC does not view it as such.124 The rationale behind the reforms was that the productive forces of China lagged behind the advanced culture and ideology developed by the party-state. In 1986, to end this deficiency, the party came to the conclusion that the main contradiction in Chinese society was that between the backward productive forces and the advanced culture and ideology of China.124 By doing this, they deemphasized class struggle, and contradicted both Mao and Karl Marx, who both considered that class struggle was the main focus of the communist movement.124 According to this logic, thwarting the CPC's goal of advancing productive forces was synonymous with class struggle.124 The classical goal of class struggle was declared by Deng to have been achieved in 1976.124 While Mao had also emphasized the need to develop productive forces, under Deng it became paramount.125
Party theoretician and former Politburo member Hu Qiaomu in his thesis "Observe economic laws, speed up the Four Modernizations", published in 1978, argued that economic laws were objective, on par with natural laws.126 He insisted that economic laws were no more negotiable "than the law of gravity".126 Hu's conclusion was that the Party was responsible for the socialist economy's acting on these economic laws.126 He believed that only an economy based on the individual would satisfy these laws, since "such an economy would be in accord with the productive forces".126 The CPC followed his line, and at the 12th National Congress, the party constitution was amended, stating that the private economy was a "needed complement to the socialist economy."126 This sentiment was echoed by Xue Muqiao; "practice shows that socialism is not necessarily based on a unified public ownership by the whole society."126
The official communiqué of the 3rd plenum of the 11th Central Committee included the words: "integrate the universal principles of Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought with the concrete practice of socialist modernization and develop it under the new historical conditions."128 With the words "new historical conditions", the CPC had in fact made it possible to view the old, Maoist ideology as obsolete (or at least certain tenants).128 To know if a policy was obsolete or not, the party had to "seek truth from facts" and follow the slogan "practice is the sole criterion of the truth".128 At the 6th plenum of the 11th Central Committee, the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" was adopted.129 The resolution separated Mao the person from Maoism, claiming that Mao had contravened Maoism during his rule.129 While the document criticized Mao, it clearly stated that he was a "proletarian revolutionary" (i.e. not all of his views were wrong), and that without Mao there would have been no new China.129 Su Shaozi, a party theoretician and the head of the Institute of Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought, argued that the CPC needed to reassess the New Economic Policy introduced by Vladimir Lenin and ended by Stalin, as well as Stalin's industrialization policies and the prominent role he gave to class struggle.130 Su concluded that the "exploiting classes in China had been eliminated".131 Dong Fureng, a Deputy Director at the Institute of Economics, agreed with the reformist discourse, first by criticizing Marx and Friedrich Engels' view that a socialist society had to abolish private property, and secondly, accusing both Marx and Engels for being vague on what kind of ownership of the means of production was necessary in socialist society.131 While both Su and Dong agreed that it was the collectivization of agriculture and the establishment of People's Communes which had ended rural exploitation, neither of them sought a return to collectivized agriculture.132
The term "socialism with Chinese characteristics" was added to the General Program of the party's constitution at the 12th National Congress, without a definition of the term.133 At the 13th National Congress, held in 1987, Zhao Ziyang, the CPC General Secretary, claimed that socialism with Chinese characteristics was the "integration of the fundamental tenets of Marxism with the modernization drive in China" and was "scientific socialism rooted in the realities of present-day China."134 By this time the CPC believed that China was in the primary stage of socialism, and therefore needed market relations so as to develop into a socialist society.135 Two years earlier, Su had tried to internationalize the term "primary stage of socialism" by claiming that socialism contained three different production phases.135 China was currently in the first phase, while the Soviet Union and the remaining Eastern Bloc countries were in the second phase.135 Because China was in the primary stage of socialism, Zhao argued that in "[China] for a long time to come, we shall develop various sectors of the economy, always ensuring the dominant position of the public sector."135 Further, some individuals should be allowed to become rich "before the objective of common prosperity [pure communism] is achieved."136 Lastly, during the primary stage of socialism, planning would no longer be the primary means of organization of the economy. Upon hearing this remark, Chen Yun, a conservative and the second-most powerful politician in China, walked out of the meeting.137
Both Chen Yun and Deng supported the formation of a private market. At the 8th National Congress, Chen first proposed an economy where the socialist sector would be dominant, with the private economy in a secondary role. 139 He believed that by following the "Ten Major Relationships", an article by Mao on how to proceed with socialist construction, the CPC could remain on the socialist road while also supporting private property.140 Chen Yun conceived of the bird-cage theory, where the bird represents the free market and the cage represents a central plan. Chen proposed that a balance should be found between "setting the bird free" and choking the bird with a central plan that was too restrictive.141
Between the time of the 13th National Congress and the Tiananmen Square incident and the ensuing crackdown, the line between right and left within the CPC became clearer.142 The rift became visible in the run-up to the 7th plenum of the 13th National Congress (in 1990), when problems arose concerning China's 8th Five-Year Plan.143 The draft for the 8th Five-Year Plan, supervised by Premier Li Peng and Deputy Premier Yao Yilin, openly endorsed Chen Yun's economic view that planning should be primary, coupled with slow, balanced growth.143 Li went further and directly contradicted Deng, stating, "Reform and opening up should not be taken as the guiding principle; instead, sustained, steady, and coordinated development should be taken as the guiding principle."143 Because of this stance, Deng rejected the Draft for the 8th Five-Year Plan, claiming that the 1990s was the "best time" for continuing with reform and opening up.144 Li and Yao even went so far as to try to annul two key resolutions passed by the 13th National Congress: the theory of socialist political civilization, and the resolution that central planning and markets were equals.144 Deng rejected the idea of reopening discussions on these subjects, and restated that reforms were essential for the CPC's future.144 Not accepting Deng's stance, party theorist Deng Liqun, along with others, began promoting "Chen Yun Thought".144 After a discussion with General Wang Zhen, a supporter of Chen Yun, Deng stated he would propose the abolishment of the Central Advisory Commission (CAC).144 Chen Yun retaliated by naming Bo Yibo to succeed him as CAC chairman.144 Indeed, when the 7th plenum of the 13th Central Committee did in fact convene, nothing notable took place, with both sides trying not to widen the ideological gap even further.145 The resolution of the 7th plenum did contain a great deal of ideological language ("firmly follow the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics"), but no clear formulation of new policy was uttered.145
Chen Yun's thoughts and policies dominated CPC discourse from 1989 until Deng's Southern Tour in 1992.146 Deng began campaigning for his reformist policies in 1991, managing to get reformist articles printed in the People's Daily and Liberation Army during this period.146 The articles criticized those communists who believed that central planning and market economics were polar opposites, instead repeating the Dengist mantra that planning and markets were only two different ways in which to regulate economic activity.147 By that time, the party had begun preparing for the 14th National Congress.148 Deng threatened to withdraw his support for Jiang Zemin's reelection as CPC General Secretary if Jiang did not accept reformist policies.148 However, at the 8th plenum of the 13th Central Committee, in 1991, the conservatives still held the upper hand within the party leadership.148
To reassert his economic agenda, in the spring of 1992, Deng made his famous southern tour of China, visiting Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai, and spending the New Year in Shanghai. He used his travels to reassert his economic policy ideas after his retirement from office.149 On the tour, Deng made many speeches and generated large local support for his reformist platform. He stressed the importance of economic reform in China, and criticized those who were against further reform and opening up.149 The tour proved that amongst the party's grassroots organizations, support for reform and opening up was firm.149 Because of this, more and more leading members of the central party leadership converted to Deng's position, amongst them Jiang Zemin.150 In his speech "Deeply Understand and Implement Comrade Deng Xiaoping's Important Spirit, Make Economic Construction, Reform and Opening Go Faster and Better" to the Central Party School, Jiang said it did not matter if a certain mechanism was capitalist or socialist, the key question was whether it worked.34 Jiang's speech is notable since it introduced the term socialist market economy, which replaced Chen Yun's "planned socialist market economy".34 In a later Politburo meeting, members voted unanimously, in old communist fashion, to continue with reform and opening up.34 Knowing that he had lost, Chen Yun gave in, and claimed that because of new conditions, the old techniques of the planned economy were outdated.34
At the 14th National Congress, the thought of Deng Xiaoping was officially dubbed Deng Xiaoping Theory, and elevated to the same level as Mao Zedong Thought.35 The concepts of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "the primary stage of socialism" were credited to him.35 At the congress, Jiang reiterated Deng's view that it was unnecessary to ask if something was socialist or capitalist, since the important factor was whether it worked.151 Several capitalist techniques were introduced, while science and technology were to be the primary productive force.151
The term ″Three Represents″ was first used in 2000 by Jiang Zemin in a trip to Guangdong province.152 From then until its inclusion in the party's constitution at the 16th National Congress, the Three Represents became a constant theme for Jiang Zemin.152 In his speech at the anniversary of the founding of the PRC, Jiang Zemin said that "we [the CPC] must always represent the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China."152 By this time, Jiang and the CPC had reached the conclusion that attaining the communist mode of production, as formulated by earlier communists, was more complex than had been realized, and that it was useless to try to force a change in the mode of production, as it had to develop naturally, by following the economic laws of history.153 While segments within the CPC criticized the Three Represents as being un-Marxist and a betrayal of basic Marxist values, supporters viewed it as a further development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.154 The theory is most notable for allowing capitalists, officially referred to as the "new social strata", to join the party on the grounds that they engaged in "honest labor and work" and through their labour contributed "to build[ing] socialism with Chinese characteristics."155 Jiang contended that capitalists should be able to join the Party on the grounds that;155
"It is not advisable to judge a person’s political orientation simply by whether he or she owns property or how much property he or she owns [...] Rather, we should judge him or her mainly by his or her political awareness, moral integrity and performance, by how he or she has acquired the property, how it has been disposed of and used, and by his or her actual contribution to the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics."
The 3rd plenum of the 16th Central Committee conceived and formulated the ideology of Scientific Outlook on Development.156 This concept is generally considered to be Hu Jintao's contribution to the official ideological discourse.157 It is considered a continuation and creative development of ideologies advanced by previous CPC leaders.157 To apply the Scientific Outlook on Development on China, the CPC must adhere to building a Harmonious Socialist Society.158 According to Hu Jintao, the concept is a sub-ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics.159 It is a further adaptation of Marxism to the specific conditions of China, and a concept open to change.159
The CPC do not believe that they have abandoned Marxism.161 The party views the world as organized into two opposing camps; socialist and capitalist.161 They insist that socialism, on the basis of historical materialism, will eventually triumph over capitalism.161 In recent years, when the party has been asked to explain the capitalist globalization occurring, the party has returned to the writings of Karl Marx.161 Marx wrote that capitalists, in their search for profit, would travel the world in a bid to establish new international markets – hence, it's generally assumed that Marx forecasted globalization.161 His writings on the subject is used to justify the CPC's market reforms, since nations, according to Marx, have little choice in the matter of joining or not.161 Opting not to take part in capitalist globalization means losing out in the fields of economic development, technological development, foreign investment and world trade.161 This view is strengthened by the economic failures of the Soviet Union and of China under Mao.162
Despite admitting that globalization developed through the capitalist system, the party's leaders and theorist argue that globalization is not intrinsically capitalist.162 The reason being that if globalization was purely capitalist, it would exclude an alternate socialist form of modernity.162 Globalization, as with the market economy, therefore does not have one specific class character (neither socialist or capitalist) according to the party.162 The instance that globalization is not fixed in nature, comes from Deng's insistence that China can pursue socialist modernization by incorporating elements of capitalism.162 Because of this there is considerable optimism within the CPC that despite the current capitalist dominance of globalization, globalization can be turned into a vehicle supporting socialism.163 This event will occur through capitalism's own contradictions.163 These contradictions are, according to party theorist Yue Yi from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "that between private ownership of the means of production and socialised production. This contradiction has manifested itself globally as the following contradictions; the contradiction between planned and regulated national economies and the unplanned and unregulated world economy; the contradiction between well-organized and scientifically managed Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and a blindly expanding and chaotic world market; the contradiction between the unlimited increase of productive capacity and the limited world market; and the contradiction between sovereign states and TNCs."164 It was these contradictions, argue Yue Yi, that led to the dot-com bubble of the 1990s, that has caused unbalanced development and polarization, and widened the gap between rich and poor.165 These contradictions will lead to the inevitable demise of capitalism and the resultant dominance of socialism.165
Deng Xiaoping, the leading figure in the reform era, did not believe that the fundamental difference between the capitalist mode of production and the socialist mode of production was central planning versus free markets. He said, "A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both ways of controlling economic activity".32 Jiang Zemin supported Deng's thinking, and stated in a party gathering that it did not matter if a certain mechanism was capitalist or socialist, because the only thing that mattered was whether it worked.34 It was at this gathering that Jiang Zemin introduced the term socialist market economy, which replaced Chen Yun's "planned socialist market economy".34 In his report to the 14th National Congress Jiang Zemin told the delegates that the socialist state would "let market forces play a basic role in resource allocation."166 At the 15th National Congress, the party line was changed to "make market forces further play their role in resource allocation"; this line continued until the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee,166 when it was amended to "let market forces play a decisive role in resource allocation."166 Despite this, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee upheld the creed "Maintain the dominance of the public sector and strengthen the economic vitality of the State-owned economy."166
The CPC, as an officially atheist institution, prohibits party members from belonging to a religion.167 Although religion is banned for party members, personal beliefs are not held accountable.167 During Mao's rule, religious movements were oppressed, and religious organizations were forbidden to have contact with foreigners.168 All religious organizations were state-owned and not independent.168 Relations with foreign religious institutions were worsened when in 1947, and again in 1949, the Vatican forbade any Catholic to support a communist party.168 On questions of religion, Deng was more open than Mao, but the issue was left unresolved during his leadership.169 According to Ye Xiaowen, the former Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, "In its infancy, the socialist movement was critical of religion. In Marx’s eyes, theology had become a bastion protecting the feudal ruling class in Germany. Therefore the political revolution had to start by criticizing religion. It was from this perspective that Marx said ‘religion is the opium of the people’."170 It was because of Marx's writings that the CPC initiated anti-religious policies under Mao and Deng.170 The Marxist view that religion would decline as modern society emerged was proven false (they believed) with the rise of Falun Gong.169
The popularity of Falun Gong, and its subsequent banning by state authorities, led to the convening of a three-day National Work Conference for Religious Affairs in 1999, the highest-level gathering on religious affairs in the party's history.171 Jiang Zemin, who had subscribed to the classical Marxist view that religion would wither away, was forced to change his mind when he learnt that religion in China was in fact growing, not decreasing.172 In his concluding speech to the National Work Conference, Jiang asked the participants to find a way to make "socialism and religion adapt to each other".173 He added that "asking religions to adapt to socialism doesn’t mean we want religious believers to give up their faith".173 Jiang ordered Ye Xiaowen to study the classical Marxist works in depth to find an excuse to liberalize the CPC's policy towards religion.173 It was discovered that Friedrich Engels had written that religion would survive as long as problems existed.173 With this rationale, religious organizations were given more autonomy.173
The CPC continues to have relations with non-ruling communist and workers' parties and attends international communist conferences, most notably the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.174 Delegates of foreign communist parties still visit China; in 2013, for instance, the General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), Jeronimo de Sousa, personally met with Liu Qibao, a member of the Central Politburo.175 In another instance, Pierre Laurent, the National Secretary of the French Communist Party (FCP), met with Liu Yunshan, a Politburo Standing Committee member.176 In 2014 Xi Jinping, the CPC General Secretary, personally met with Gennady Zyuganov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), to discuss party-to-party relations.177 While the CPC retains contact with major parties such as the PCP,175 FCP,176 the CPRF,178 the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia,179 the Communist Party of Brazil,180 the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist−Leninist)181 and the Communist Party of Spain,182 the party retains relations with minor communist and workers' parties, such as the Communist Party of Australia,183 the Workers Party of Bangladesh, the Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist–Leninist) (Barua), the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, the Workers' Party of Belgium, the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Dominican Workers' Party and the Party for the Transformation of Honduras, for instance.184 In recent years, noting the self-reform of the European social democratic movement in the 1980s and 1990s, the CPC "has noted the increased marginalization of West European communist parties."185
The CPC has retained close relations with the remaining socialist states still espousing communism: Cuba, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam and their respective ruling parties.186 It spends a fair amount of time analyzing the situation in the remaining socialist states, trying to reach conclusions as to why these states survived when so many did not, following the collapse of the Eastern European socialist states in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.187 In general, the analyses of the remaining socialist states and their chances of survival have been positive, and the CPC believes that the socialist movement will be revitalized sometime in the future.187
The ruling party which the CPC is most interested in is the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).188 In general the CPV is considered a model example of socialist development in the post-Soviet era.188 Chinese analysts on Vietnam believe that the introduction of the Doi Moi reform policy at the 6th CPV National Congress is the key reason for Vietnam's current success.188
While the CPC is probably the organization with most access to North Korea, writing about North Korea is tightly circumscribed.187 The few reports accessible to the general public are those about North Korean economic reforms.187 While Chinese analysts of North Korea tend to speak positively of North Korea in public, in official discussions they show much disdain for North Korea's economic system, the cult of personality which pervades society, the Kim family, the idea of hereditary succession in a socialist state, the security state, the use of scarce resources on the Korean People's Army and the general impoverishment of the North Korean people.189 There are those analysts who compare the current situation of North Korea with that of China during the Cultural Revolution.190 Over the years, the CPC has tried to persuade the Workers' Party of Korea (or WPK, North Korea's ruling party) to introduce economic reforms by showing them key economic infrastructure in China.190 For instance, in 2006 the CPC invited the WPK General Secretary Kim Jong-il to Guandong province to showcase the success economic reforms have brought China.190 In general, the CPC considers the WPK and North Korea to be negative examples of a communist ruling party and socialist state.190
There is a considerable degree of interest in Cuba within the CPC.188 Fidel Castro, the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), is greatly admired, and books have been written focusing on the successes of the Cuban Revolution.188 Communication between the CPC and the PCC has increased considerably since the 1990s, hardly a month going by without a diplomatic exchange.191 At the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee, which discussed the possibility of the CPC learning from other ruling parties, praise was heaped on the PCC.191 When Wu Guanzheng, a Central Politburo member, met with Fidel Castro in 2007, he gave him a personal letter written by Hu Jintao: "Facts have shown that China and Cuba are trustworthy good friends, good comrades, and good brothers who treat each other with sincerity. The two countries' friendship has withstood the test of a changeable international situation, and the friendship has been further strengthened and consolidated."192
Since the decline and fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the CPC has begun establishing party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.97 These relations are sought so that the CPC can learn from them.193 For instance, the CPC has been eager to understand how the People's Action Party of Singapore (PAP) maintains its total domination over Singaporean politics through its "low-key presence, but total control."194 According to the CPC's own analysis of Singapore, the PAP's dominance can be explained by its "well-developed social network, which controls constituencies effectively by extending its tentacles deeply into society through branches of government and party-controlled groups."194 While the CPC accepts that Singapore is a democracy, they view it as a guided democracy led by the PAP.194 Other differences are, according to the CPC, "that it is not a political party based on the working class—instead it is a political party of the elite ... It is also a political party of the parliamentary system, not a revolutionary party."195 Other parties the CPC studies and maintains strong party-to-party relations with are the United Malays National Organisation, which has ruled Malaysia democratically since 1957, and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which dominated Japanese politics from 1955 to 2009.196 The KMT is another case entirely, where party-to-party relations are retained so as to strengthen the probability of the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.197 However, several studies have been written on the KMT's loss of power in 2000, after having ruled Taiwan since 1949 (the KMT officially ruled China, then called the Republic of China, from 1928 to 1949).197 In general, one-party states or dominant-party states are of special interest to the party, and party-to-party relations are formed so that the CPC can study them.197 For instance, the longevity of the Syrian Regional Branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party is attributed to the personalization of power in the al-Assad family, the strong presidential system, the inheritance of power, which passed from Hafez al-Assad to his son Bashar al-Assad, and the role given to the Syrian military in politics.198
In recent years, the CPC has been especially interested in Latin America,198 as shown by the increasing number of delegates sent to and received from these countries.198 Of special fascination for the CPC is the 71-year-long rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico.198 While the CPC attributed the PRI's long reign in power to the strong presidential system, tapping into the machismo culture of the country, its nationalist posture, its close identification with the rural populace and the implementation of nationalization alongside the marketization of the economy, 198 the CPC concluded that the PRI failed because of the lack of inner-party democracy, its pursuit of social democracy, its rigid party structures that could not be reformed, its political corruption, the pressure of globalization, and American interference in Mexican politics.198 While the CPC was slow to recognize the Pink tide in Latin America, it has strengthened party-to-party relations with several socialist and anti-American political parties over the years.199 There may have been some irritation over Hugo Chavez's anti-capitalist and anti-American rhetoric on the CPC's part.199 Despite this, in 2013 the CPC reached an agreement with the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the party founded by Chavez, for the CPC to educate PSUV cadres in political and social fields.200 By 2008, the CPC claimed to have established relations with 99 political parties in 29 Latin American countries.199
European social democracy has been of great interest to the CPC since the early 1980s.199 With the exception of a short period in which the CPC forged party-to-party relations with far-right parties during the 1970s in an effort to halt "Soviet expansionism", the CPC's relations with European social democratic parties were its first serious efforts to establish cordial party-to-party relations with non-communist parties.199 The CPC credits the European social democrats with creating a "capitalism with a human face".199 Before the 1980s, the CPC had a highly negative and dismissive view of social democracy, a view dating back to the Second International and the Leninist and Stalinist view on the social democratic movement.199 By the 1980s that view had changed, and the CPC concluded that it could actually learn something from the social democratic movement.199 CPC delegates were sent all over Europe to observe.201 It should be noted that by the 1980s most European social democratic parties were facing electoral decline, and were in a period of self-reform.201 The CPC followed this with great interest, laying most weight on reform efforts within the British Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany.201 The CPC concluded that both parties were reelected because they modernized, replacing traditional state socialist tenets with new ones supporting privatization, shedding the belief in big government, conceiving a new view of the welfare state, changing negative views of the market, and moving from their traditional support base of trade unions to entrepreneurs, younger members and students.202
- Politics of the People's Republic of China
- Succession of power in the People's Republic of China
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Persecution of Falun Gong
- Sometimes referred to as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
- "China’s Communist Party Reports First New Member Drop in Decade". Bloomberg Businessweek. Bloomberg L.P. 30 June 2014. Retrieved 30 June 2013.
- "History of the Communist Party of China". Xinhua. 29 April 2011. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- Van de Ven 1991, p. 26.
- Van de Ven 1991, p. 27.
- Van de Ven 1991, pp. 34–38.
- Van de Ven 1991, p. 38.
- Van de Ven 1991, p. 44.
- Gao 2009, p. 119.
- Schram 1966, pp. 84, 89.
- Feigon 2002, p. 42.
- Schram 1966, p. 106.
- Carter 1976, pp. 61–62.
- Schram 1966, p. 112.
- Schram 1966, pp. 106–109, 112–113.
- Carter 1976, p. 62.
- Carter 1976, p. 63.
- Carter 1976, p. 64.
- Schram 1966, pp. 122–125.
- Feigon 2002, pp. 46–47.
- Leung 1992, p. 72.
- Leung 1992, p. 370.
- Leung 1992, p. 354.
- Leung 1992, p. 355.
- Leung 1992, p. 95.
- Leung 1992, p. 96.
- Leung 1996, p. 96.
- Leung 1992, p. 407.
- Kornberg & Faust 2005, p. 103.
- Wong 2005, p. 131.
- Wong 2005, p. 47.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 254.
- Deng, Xiaoping (30 June 1984). "Building a Socialism with a specifically Chinese character". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Retrieved 13 January 2013.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 25.
- Vogel 2011, p. 682.
- Vogel 2011, p. 684.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 100.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 238.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 317.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 329.
- "Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping meet delegates to 18th CPC National Congress". Xinhua. 16 November 2011. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- Staff writer (20 September 2014). "The Rise and Rise of Xi Jinping: Xi who must be obeyed". The Economist. Retrieved 12 October 2014.
- Unger 2002, p. 22.
- Baylis 1989, p. 102.
- Unger 2002, pp. 22–24.
- Unger 2002, p. 158.
- Chuanzi, Wang (1 October 2013). "Democratic Centralism: The Core Mechanism in China’s Political System". Qiushi. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Retrieved 5 January 2014.
- "IV. The System of Multi-Party Cooperation and Political Consultation". China.org.cn. Retrieved 5 January 2014.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 70.
- Liu 2011, p. 48.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 228.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, pp. 228–229.
- Li 2009, p. 8.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 229.
- Leung & Kau 1992, p. 74.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005, p. 117.
- Broodsgaard & Yongnian 2006, p. 79.
- Broodsgaard & Yongnian 2006, pp. 79–80.
- Broodsgaard & Yongnian 2006, p. 81.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 66.
- Abrami, Malesky & Zheng 2008, p. 26.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 67.
- Abrami, Malesky & Zheng 2008, p. 27.
- Abrami, Malesky & Zheng 2008, pp. 28–29.
- Joseph 2010, p. 394.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 86.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 68.
- Wang & Zheng 2012, p. 12.
- Li 2009, p. 64.
- Li 2009, p. 65.
- Liu 2011, p. 41.
- Staff writer (13 November 2012). "General Secretary of CPC Central Committee". China Radio International. Retrieved 8 December 2013.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 85.
- Joseph 2010, p. 169.
- Miller 2011, pp. 1–2.
- Miller 2011, p. 2.
- Miller 2011, p. 5.
- Miller 2011, pp. 5–6.
- Miller 2011, p. 6.
- Miller 2011, p. 7.
- Abrami, Malesky & Zheng 2008, p. 19.
- Köllner 2013, p. 18.
- Abrami, Malesky & Zheng 2008, p. 21.
- Fu 1993, p. 201.
- Ogden 2013, p. 24.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 74.
- Mackerras, McMillen & Watson 2001, p. 75.
- "China media: Third Plenum". British Broadcasting Corporation. BBC Online. 13 November 2013. Retrieved 30 January 2014.
- Page, Jeremy (24 January 2014). "Chinese power play: Xi Jinping creates a national security council". Wall Street Journal. News Corp. Retrieved 30 January 2014.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 212.
- Li 1995, p. 8.
- Yeh 1996, p. 231.
- McGregor 2012, p. 77.
- McGregor 2012, pp. 77–78.
- McGregor, Richard (30 September 2009). "The party organiser". Financial Times. Retrieved 9 December 2013.
- McGregor 2012, p. 17.
- Guo 2012, p. 123.
- West & Smith 2012, p. 127.
- Finer 2003, p. 43.
- Bush 2005, p. 200.
- Shambaugh 2013, p. 190.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 49.
- Latham 2007, p. 124.
- Chambers 2002, p. 37.
- Yu 2010, p. viii.
- "Constitution of the Communist Party of China". People's Daily. Communist Party of China. Retrieved 2 January 2014.
- Sullivan 2012, p. 183.
- Central Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (6 November 2012). "Occupational Structure of CPC Members (2011)". Chinagate. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
- Central Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (6 November 2012). "Gender Proportion of CPC Members (2011)". Chinagate. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
- Sullivan 2007, p. 582.
- Sullivan 2007, p. 583.
- Hui, Lu (17 June 2013). "Communist Youth League convenes national congress". Xinhua. Retrieved 12 January 2014.
- "Flag and emblem of Communist Party of China". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 29 March 2013. Retrieved 5 January 2014.
- Brown 2012, p. 52.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 105.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 369.
- "Ideological Foundation of the CPC". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 30 October 2012. Retrieved 26 December 2013.
- Staff writer (26 December 2013). "Mao Zedong Thought". Xinhua. Retrieved 26 December 2013.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 104.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 98.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 99.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 115.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 528.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 527.
- Chan 2003, p. 177.
- Chan 2003, p. 178.
- Chan 2003, p. 179.
- Vogel2011, p. 353.
- Chan 2003, p. 180.
- Chan 2003, p. 181.
- Chan 2003, p. 182.
- Chan 2003, p. 183.
- Chan 2003, pp. 183–184.
- Chan 2003, p. 187.
- Chan 2003, pp. 187–188.
- Chan 2003, p. 188.
- Chan 2003, p. 188–189.
- Vogel 2011, p. 470.
- Vogel 2011, p. 667.
- Coase & Wang 2012, p. 73.
- Coase & Wang 2012, p. 74.
- Coase & Wang 2012, pp. 74–75.
- Baum 1996, pp. 317–321.
- Baum 1996, p. 320.
- Baum 1996, p. 321.
- Baum 1996, p. 322.
- Vogel 2011, pp. 668–669.
- Vogel 2011, p. 668.
- Vogel 2011, p. 669.
- Vogel 2011, pp. 669–680.
- Vogel 2011, pp. 681–682.
- Vogel 2011, p. 685.
- Chan 2003, p. 201.
- Kuhn 2011, pp. 107–108.
- Kuhn 2011, pp. 108–109.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 110.
- Izuhara 2013, p. 110.
- Guo, Guo & 2008 119.
- Guo & Guo 2008, p. 121.
- "Scientific Outlook on Development". China Radio International. 1 November 2012. Retrieved 3 January 2014.
- Buckley, Chris (13 February 2014). "Xi Touts Communist Party as Defender of Confucius’s Virtues". The New York Times. Retrieved 13 February 2014.
- Heazle & Knight 2007, p. 62.
- Heazle & Knight 2007, p. 63.
- Heazle & Knight 2007, p. 64.
- Heazle & Knight 2007, pp. 64–65.
- Heazle & Knight 2007, p. 65.
- "Marketization the key to economic system reform". China Daily. China Daily Group. 18 November 2013. Retrieved 22 December 2013.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 373.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 362.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 365.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 364.
- Kuhn 2011, pp. 366–367.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 367.
- Kuhn 2011, p. 368.
- "15 IMCWP, List of participants". International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Solidnet.org. 11 November 2013. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "Senior CPC official meets Portuguese Communist Party leader". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 21 February 2013. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "Senior CPC official vows to develop friendly cooperation with French Communist Party". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 8 December 2011. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "Chinese president meets Russian Communist Party delegation". China Daily. 26 September 2014. Retrieved 13 October 2014.
- "Senior CPC official meets Russian delegation". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 24 August 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "CPC to institutionalize talks with European parties". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 19 May 2011. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "Senior CPC leader meets chairman of Communist Party of Brazil". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 5 July 2005. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "A Leadership Delegation of The Communist Party of Nepal (unified Marxist−Leninist)". China Executive Leadership Academy, Jinggangshan. 27 June 2012. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "CPC leader pledges exchanges with Communist Party of Spain". People's Daily. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 6 April 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "12th CPA Congress". Central Committee of the Communist Party of Australia. 12 September 2013. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- "More foreign party leaders congratulate CPC on National Congress". Xinhua. 16 November 2010. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 100.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 81.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 82.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 84.
- Shambaugh 2008, pp. 82–83.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 83.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 85.
- Shambaugh 2008, pp. 85–86.
- Shambaugh 2008, pp. 86–92.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 93.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 94.
- Shambaugh 2008, pp. 95–96.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 96.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 97.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 98.
- "Chinese Communist Party to train chavista leaders". El Universal. 13 May 2013. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
- Shambaugh 2008, p. 99.
- Shambaugh 2008, pp. 99–100.
- Articles & journal entries
- Abrami, Regina; Malesky, Edmund; Zheng, Yu (2008). "Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China". University of California Press. pp. 1–46.
- Brown, Kerry (2 August 2012). "The Communist Party of China and Ideology". China: An International Journal 10 (2) (National University of Singapore Press (NUS Press)). pp. 52–68.
- Chambers, David Ian (30 April 2002). "Edging In from the Cold: The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography". Journal of the American Intelligence Professional 56 (3) (Central Intelligence Agency). pp. 31–46.
- Dynon, Nicholas (July 2008). ""Four Civilizations" and the Evolution of Post-Mao Chinese Socialist Ideology". The China Journal 60 (University of Chicago Press). pp. 83–109.
- Li, Cheng (19 November 2009). "Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?" 30 (4). China Leadership Monitor. pp. 1–14.
- Köllner, Patrick (August 2013). "Informal Institutions in Autocracies: Analytical Perspectives and the Case of the Chinese Communist Party" (232). German Institute of Global and Area Studies. pp. 1–30.
- Miller, H. Lyman (19 November 2009). "Hu Jintao and the Party Politburo" 32 (9). China Leadership Monitor. pp. 1–11.
- Baum, Richard (1996). Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691036373.
- Baylis, Thomas (1989). Governing by Committee: Collegial Leadership in Advanced Societies. State University of New York Press. ISBN 9780887069444.
- Bush, Richard (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815797818.
- Broodsgaard, Kjeld Erik; Yongnian, Zheng (2006). The Chinese Communist Party in Reform. Routledge. ISBN 0203099281.
- Carter, Peter (1976). Mao. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0192731408.
- Chan, Adrian (2003). Chinese Marxism. Continuum Publishing. ISBN 0826473075.
- Coase, Ronald; Wang, Ling, (2012). How China Became Capitalist. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1137019360.
- Ding, X.L. (2006). The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977–1989. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521026237.
- Feigon, Lee (2002). Mao: A Reinterpretation. Ivan R. Dee. ISBN 1566635225.
- Finer, Catherine Jones (2003). Social Policy Reform in China: Views from Home and Abroad. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 0754631753.
- Fu, Zhengyuan (1993). Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521442281.
- Gao, James (2009). Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949). Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0810863081.
- Gregor, A. James (1999). Marxism, China & Development: Reflections on Theory and Reality. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1412828155.
- Gucheng, Li (1995). A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China. Chinese University Press. ISBN 9622016154.
- Guo, Sujian (2012). Chinese Politics and Government: Power, Ideology and Organization. Routledge. ISBN 0415551382.
- Guo, Sujian; Guo, Baogang (2008). China in Search of a Harmonious Society. Rowman & Littlefield|Lexington Books. ISBN 0739126245.
- Heazle, Michael; Knight, Nick (2007). China–Japan Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Creating a Future Past?. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 1781956235.
- Izuhara, Misa (2013). Handbook on East Asian Social Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 085793029X.
- Keping, Yu (2010). Democracy and the Rule of Law in China. Brill Publishers. ISBN 9004182128.
- Kornberg, Judith; Faust, John (2005). China in World Politics: Policies, Processes, Prospects. University of British Columbia Press. ISBN 1588262480.
- Kuhn, Robert Lawrence (2011). How China's Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China's Past, Current and Future Leaders. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 1118104250.
- Latham, Kevin (2007). Pop Culture China!: Media, Arts, and Lifestyle. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1851095829.
- Leung, Edwin Pak-wah, ed. (1992). Historical Dictionary of Revolutionary China, 1839–1976. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0313264570.
- Li, Cheng (2009). China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815752083.
- Liu, Guoli (2011). Politics and Government in China. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 0313357315.
- Joseph, William (2010). Politics in China: an Introduction. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195335309.
- Mackerras, Colin; McMillen, Donald; Watson, Andrew (2001). Dictionary of the Politics of the People's Republic of China. Routledge. ISBN 0415250676.
- McGregor, Richard (2012). The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers (2nd ed.). Harper Perennial. ISBN 0061708763.
- Musto, Marcello (2008). Karl Marx S Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy 150 Years Later. Routledge. ISBN 1134073828.
- Smith, Ivian; West, Nigel (2012). Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0810871742.
- Ogden, Chris (2013). Handbook of China s Governance and Domestic Politics. Routledge. ISBN 1136579532.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005). Governance in China. OECD Publishing. ISBN 9264008446.
- Saich, Tony; Yang, Benjamin (1995). The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and Analysis. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 1563241552.
- Schram, Stuart (1966). Mao Tse-Tung. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0140208402.
- Shambaugh, David (2008). China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. University of California Press]]. ISBN 0520254929.
- Shambaugh, David (2013). China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0199323690.
- Sullivan, Lawrence (2007). Historical Dictionary of the People's Republic of China. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0810864436.
- Sullivan, Lawrence (2012). Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0810872250.
- Unger, Jonathan (2002). The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0765641151.
- Van de Ven, Hans J. (1991). From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920–1927. University of California Press. ISBN 0520910877.
- Vogel, Ezra (2011). Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674055446.
- Yeh, Wen-hsin (1996). Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism. University of California Press. ISBN 0520916328.
- Wang, Gunwu; Zheng, Yongian (2012). China: Development and Governance. World Scientific. ISBN 9814425834.
- White, Stephen (2000). Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521587379.
- Wong, Yiu-chung (2005). From Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin: Two Decades of Political Reform in the People's Republic of China. University Press of America. ISBN 076183074X.
- Zheng, Suisheng (2004). A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804750017.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to:|
- People's Daily, official mouthpiece